CHAPTER

15

CANADA: ETHNIC MODEL OF THE FUTURE?

ASK AMERICANS TO NAME the capital of Russia, a society very distant from the United States both geographically and culturally, and most will probably answer correctly. Ask them to name the capital of Canada, a society bordering the United States for the entire length of the continent and culturally almost as close, and most will be hard-pressed. One reason Americans pay so little attention to and know so little about Canada is that its sociological features are assumed to be replicas of their own. In the American mind, Canada might easily pass for the fifty-first state.

Undeniably, the economic and cultural hegemony of the United States on the North American continent for two centuries has created great similarities in the two societies. But the fact that Americans can easily feel at home in Canada tends to disguise some fundamental differences. Common cultural preferences, consumer patterns, political alliances, and for two-thirds of Canada, language, do not make Canadian society simply a northern microcosm of the United States. These differences are nowhere more apparent than in the realm of ethnic relations.

Canada is a society whose ethnic structure is today extremely diverse. Moreover, it displays some features of the corporate pluralistic model described in Chapter 4. This state of affairs stems primarily from the presence of two founding groups, British and French, each of whose language and culture have been legally protected since the eighteenth century. The present language division in the society is shown in Table 15.1. Most of Canada's French-speaking people

Table 15.1 Mother Tongue of the Canadian Population

LANGUAGE	NUMBER	PERCENT
English	16,890,615	60.0
French	6,636,660	23.6
Chinese	715,640	2.5
Italian	484,500	1.7
German	450,140	1.6
Other	2,948,005	10.5
Total	28,125,560	100.0

SOURCE: Statistics Canada, 1996.

(Francophones) live in the province of Quebec, creating for them, in addition to their linguistic and cultural distinction, a territorial base. English-speaking Canadians (Anglophones), by contrast, are dispersed throughout Canada and include groups of various national origins. Those of British origin, however, are recognized as the cofounding group and remain the largest segment of English Canada.

In a sense, then, Canada is not one nation but two. As we saw in Chapter 1, when ethnic groups occupy a definable territory—as do French Canadians—they also commonly maintain or aspire to some degree of political autonomy. Hence, they are "nations within nations." The Canadian experiment in national dualism is still being conducted, and the issues separating the English and French fragments have by no means been resolved. Indeed, the historical discord between these two major cultural groups has in recent decades intensified, making the union of Canada more precarious than ever.

The relations between English and French Canadians constitute the first and most important dimension of ethnicity in Canada, cutting across other lines of ethnic diversity. As such, English-French relations will occupy most of our attention in this chapter. Two other dimensions of ethnicity in Canada, however, are extremely important, even if their manifestations have not been so dramatic. One concerns the various ethnic groups whose origins are neither British nor French, together composing one-third of the Canadian population. Canada is a society of virtually dozens of distinct ethnic groups varying in national origin, culture, and racial features. The important social issues pertaining to these groups involve the nature and extent of their cultural and structural assimilation. Because Canada is at least officially a bilingual society, however, these groups have fallen within the realm of either Anglophones or Francophones and are therefore part of the dual-nation issue as well.

The third ethnic dimension involves the relations of native (Aboriginal) peoples with the rest of Canadian society. Canadian Indians, usually referred to as "First Nations," and Inuit (Eskimos) are, along with their American counterparts, the original peoples of the continent. Today they are a relatively tiny proportion of the Canadian population. Their official status, their cultural systems, and the nature of their relations with other groups, however, largely set them apart from the rest of the society. Hence, they must be looked at as a unique component of the Canadian ethnic configuration.

These three dimensions create a complex ethnic picture in which the different elements are interwoven in complicated and, to American eyes, often bewildering combinations (Figure 15.1). Moreover, this ethnic diversity, particularly in recent decades, has yielded public policies more pluralistic in approach than those of the United States. Whereas the United States has, for most of its history, been committed to an assimilationist approach (at least for those groups

Figure 15.1 The Three Dimensions of Ethnic Relations in Canada



of European origin), the Canadian philosophy has traditionally been more tolerant of the continued expression of cultural differences among diverse groups.

FORMATION OF THE CANADIAN ETHNIC MOSAIC

We can begin to make sense of Canada's ethnic mosaic by looking first at the historical process by which ethnic diversity in this society has taken shape.

The Evolution of Two Nations: The English-French Schism

Most Americans have in recent years become at least vaguely aware of ethnic stirrings in Canada, specifically, the conflict in Quebec concerning French and English speakers. The roots of this conflict, however, reach back over 200 years. Although other ethnic groups would subsequently contribute to Canada's population, the confrontation of English and French groups consumed the affairs of state from the outset and continues to play the preeminent role in internal relations. French-speaking Canadians are about 24 percent of the Canadian population, and as earlier noted, they live for the most part in a single province, Quebec. The historical and contemporary relations between French and English Canadians form the major focus of ethnic conflict in Canada.

The English Conquest Both Britain and France established colonies in North America beginning in the early seventeenth century and vied for continental dominance for almost a century and a half. The victory in 1759 of the British forces led by General Wolfe over the French on the Plains of Abraham marked the end of French colonialism in North America, but it did not eliminate the presence of a French cultural group. New France (Quebec) was now made politically part of the British colonial empire, but its French inhabitants were granted the right to certain cultural privileges, including the retention of French civil law, the use of the French language, and the practice of Catholicism. The price of this cultural autonomy, however, was that French Canada was placed in the position of a permanent minority within an English milieu. From the moment of British ascendancy in Quebec, French Canadians were consumed with avoiding assimilation into the English-speaking North America that surrounded them. And it is this objective of cultural survival that remains at the heart of today's English-French schism.

During and after the American Revolutionary War, thousands of English-speaking emigrants from the thirteen American colonies who had remained loyal to Britain entered Canada. Many of these United Empire Loyalists, as they were called, settled in Quebec. This gave the province for the first time a substantial English-speaking population, which quickly came into conflict with the

French majority over economic and political issues. In an attempt to separate the two groups, Britain established an Upper and a Lower Canada, the former composed mostly of English-speaking people, the latter of French-speaking. These would later become the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The national duality was thus firmly established, with two peoples, differing essentially in language and culture, juxtaposed geographically and socially.

Although the French in Quebec were not threatened in a numerical sense by the influx of English-speaking people, this period of English-French relations marked the establishment of English dominance of the Quebec economy. With the exit of the French commercial elite following the British conquest, business and financial activities became the domain of the English, and the French Canadians remained mostly on the land as subsistence farmers. This cultural division of labor became a fixed arrangement that lasted into the modern era, making the French a numerical majority but an economic minority in their own province.

The disparities in power, wealth, and social position between English and French in Lower Canada led to the emergence of a French nationalist political element that sought the colony's independence. An open rebellion ensued in 1837, after which Britain consolidated Upper and Lower Canada into a single union. The underlying objective of this move was the eventual assimilation of the French into the English colonial society. To bring about this end, discriminatory measures were enacted assuring Anglo dominance.

In addition, with the failure of the rebellion, the conservative forces of French Canada were now ascendant. The clergy, in particular, reinforced its influence in the life of the French-speaking people and extended the doctrine that the French-Canadian culture could be sustained only through loyalty to the Catholic faith and the French language. This traditional nationalism, combining a rural-oriented way of life with a staunch Catholicism, held sway among the French-Canadian masses until the mid-twentieth century (Juteau Lee, 1979). The clergy, then, assumed the dominant institutional role in Quebec, promoting détente with the English colonialists as a means of assuring *la survivance*, the survival of the French culture.[1]

Confederation In 1867, the Canadian provinces were linked in a federal system. The effect of confederation was to further isolate Quebec from the rest of Canada and to heighten the minority status of French Canadians. Although the French and English languages were both protected by law, only in Quebec was the principle of bilingualism instituted, and there it was strictly one-sided—Francophones were forced to use English in dealings with the Anglo Quebecers, but the reverse was not the case. Outside Quebec, Francophones found

[1]A classic description of this traditional Quebec culture is found in Miner (1939). More recent essays are contained in Rioux and Martin (1978).

themselves defenseless against the Anglophone majority, which chose to ignore the need for French schools and other institutions. The powerlessness of French Canadians was driven home in numerous instances in which minority interests or wishes were swept aside by the dominance of English Canada.

For French Canadians perhaps the most humiliating aspect of the relationship with English Canada was the minority status to which they were relegated in their own province. English control of Quebec's commerce and finance produced an English-speaking business elite, assuring that higher-status positions would remain the reserve of Anglophones.

The Catholic church's control of education in the province also handicapped the upward mobility of the French-speaking masses. Expounding the philosophy of French-Canadian cultural survival through retreat to church and land, the clergy emphasized the humanities, classics, and religion in schools and colleges—not the commercial and technical skills that were appropriate to an industrial system. Hence, few French Canadians were prepared for skilled positions in business and science. As French Canada increasingly industrialized, Francophones therefore occupied the least-skilled and lowest-ranking jobs (Porter, 1965).

Emergence of a New French Nationalism Industrialization beginning in the early decades of the twentieth century set in motion social processes that would gradually spell the demise of the pastoral, clerical Quebec culture. Urbanization accompanied the growth of industry. Whereas Quebec had been 60 percent rural in 1900, by 1931 it was 63 percent urban (Legendre, 1980). The focus of this rural-urban movement was Montreal, which tripled in size from 1901 to 1921. Industrialization and urbanization conflicted with the traditional Catholic nationalism, which continued to stress agrarian and ecclesiastical values. The customary culture of Quebec society was clearly no longer compatible with the forces of modernization.

The industrialization of Quebec, however, was not sponsored by French-Canadian capital but by outsiders—specifically, English-Canadian, American, and British capitalists. Quebecers thus found themselves in a colonial-like situation. The skilled and more desirable jobs naturally went to the Anglophones, and the French speakers, though a numerical majority, were given the unskilled, menial positions. By the 1960s French Canadians were the most poorly paid workers in Quebec, below even the newly arrived immigrants from Europe, and their standard of living was below that of the average Canadian (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969a).

The English of Quebec, as members of an insular group with their own institutional structure—schools, businesses, churches, and neighborhoods—held an attitude toward the Francophones of arrogance and even disdain. They made little effort to learn French, for it was unnecessary. On the con-

trary, because so many jobs were controlled by the Anglophone business class, all the pressure was on the Francophones to learn English. In his classic account of a French-Canadian community of the 1930s, Everett C. Hughes noted that not only was there no need for the English residents of the town to speak French, but to do so in any case would have upset the subordinate-superordinate relationship:

> In fact, the English do not have to learn French to keep their position in industry. The housewife does not have to learn French to keep her housemaid. If they were to speak French in these relationships—except in a joking or patronizing spirit, as is occasionally done—they would be in some measure reversing roles. For they would then be making the greater effort, which generally falls to the subordinate; and they would speak French badly, whereas the subordinate generally speaks English pretty well. (1943:83)

Living in cohesive areas and in control of the most important commercial and financial institutions, Quebec's English community could, by and large, ignore the French around them. It was a situation described by novelist Hugh MacLennan (1945) as "two solitudes," French and English living side by side but essentially in different social worlds.

The Quiet Revolution The decade of the 1960s in Quebec is often referred to as the "Quiet Revolution," for it was then that the transformation of French-Canadian society that had begun in the early part of the century culminated in the emergence of a powerful nationalist ideology espoused by Quebec leaders determined to make Francophones *maîtres chez nous*—"masters in our own house." Though revolutionary only in a figurative sense, the changes accomplished during this period basically redefined both the role of government in Quebec and the identity and goals of French-Canadian society (Posgate, 1978).

The key instrument for change was the state. In the past, the provincial government had been viewed as a force in sustaining the status quo; but it now became the principal vehicle of change. Responsibility for health, welfare, and especially education became the concern of the Quebec state, whereas in the past these had been largely church-sponsored institutions. In the economic realm, the state pursued the objective of improving the position of Francophones and eventually ending Anglophone control of the important segments of the economy (McRoberts, 1988). In short, with the development of a dynamic state led by a new middle class, technologically skilled and ideologically committed to a strong and self-sufficient society, Quebec by 1970 was well on the way toward a social and political transformation.

The Rise of the Parti Québecois The new nationalism spawned strong sentiments favoring the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada and the formation of an independent French-speaking nation. In the late 1960s, elements of the Francophone leadership that had emerged from the Quiet Revolution began to promote the idea that there was no longer any middle ground between partnership within the Canadian confederation and full sovereignty for Quebec; the latter was the only realistic option if Quebecers were to fully control their destiny. To consolidate and advance the achievements of the Quiet Revolution, Quebec, they felt, had to fully sever its ties with Canada (Posgate, 1978). Led by René Lévesque, they left the ruling Liberal Party (which, during the regime of Jean Lesage, had initiated the radical changes of the Quiet Revolution) and formed the Parti Québecois, declaring as its objective the political liberation of the Francophone community. Recognizing the need to retain an economic link with the rest of Canada, however, Lévesque created the notion of sovereignty-association, which proposed that a politically independent Quebec would retain close economic ties to Canada. Nothing short of the removal of Quebec from its historical place in the Canadian union, however, was the avowed aim of the Parti Québecois. In its view, the split with English Canada was absolute and irreversible. "First and foremost I am a Québecois," declared Lévesque, "and second—with a rather growing doubt—a Canadian" (Saywell, 1977:4).

By the early 1970s the growing support among Quebecers for the new, radically nationalist Parti Québecois was evident and alarming to English Canada. Even more alarming were the activities of a small extremist separatist group, the *Front de Libération du Québec* (FLQ), whose violent tactics and revolutionary ideology provoked a crisis in 1970 prompting the federal prime minister, Pierre Trudeau, to briefly invoke the War Measures Act, giving the police sweeping powers to arrest and detain suspected persons.

This was a wrenching experience for Quebec and all of Canada that in part forced the separatists to moderate their proposals for change. In response, Lévesque stressed the democratic processes by which Quebec's independence was to be attained and emphasized the "economic association" aspect of the envisioned sovereignty-association relationship with Canada. The Parti Québecois declared that if it were elected to power, it would put the issue of sovereignty-association before the people of Quebec as a referendum, to accept or reject.

In 1976, only eight years after its formation, the Parti Québecois won election as the government of Quebec. Its stunning victory sent shock waves throughout English Canada. For the first time, the contemporary Quebec nationalist movement drew the serious attention of even the United States. What had been feared since 1970 had occurred—the election of a provincial government ideologically committed to the separation of Quebec from Canada, led by

the charismatic Lévesque. It now seemed that the division of Canada into two separate nations, in a real rather than a symbolic sense, was possible.[2]

Sovereignty-Association: The Recurrent Issue In 1980, the referendum on sovereignty-association that Lévesque had promised was held. Lévesque downplayed the independence aspects of the measure and emphasized that approval of sovereignty-association meant only that Quebec would enter into "a new partnership" with Canada. Moreover, the referendum was worded so that approval was only a first step toward political independence. It would give the Quebec government merely a mandate to negotiate a new arrangement with Canada, approval of which in any case would be left to the people through another referendum.

By a margin of three to two, Quebecers rejected the idea of sovereignty-association. Not unexpectedly, virtually all Anglophones voted no, but a slight majority of Francophones did as well. For the moment, then, the intensity of the Quebec nationalist movement had been quelled. In 1985 the Parti Québecois was defeated and replaced with a government led by Robert Bourassa—the same Bourassa whom, nine years earlier, it had defeated.

A decline in Quebec nationalism was induced as well by the economic changes that had occurred in the province during the previous decade. Business participation by Francophones was encouraged by the government, and managerial positions were increasingly made available to them. With the decline of English economic dominance, a growing number of Quebecers took control of much of the Quebec economy, forming a kind of Francophone economic elite, replacing the traditional Anglophone economic leadership.

The fundamental issues of the relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada, however, had not been resolved. In the late 1980s, these issues surfaced again resoundingly. The catalyst was an effort to induce Quebec to sign the new Canadian constitution, adopted in 1982. To this end, an accord was reached in 1987 between Quebec and the federal government, giving the province broader independent powers. Most important, under the agreement, Quebec was to be given special recognition among Canadian provinces as a "distinct society." Some in English Canada, acknowledging Quebec's cultural uniqueness, believed that such exceptional political recognition was correct. Others held that Quebec should be accorded no special status. This pact, called the Meech Lake Accord, failed to be ratified by all the Canadian provinces in 1990 and thus was not adopted. This was widely interpreted in Quebec as a rebuff by English Canada, again igniting strong support for the nationalist cause of separation from Canada.

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[2]Much of the support for the Parti Québecois was based not on its advocacy of separatism but on its promise to deliver "good government" and on public disaffection with the relationship between Quebec and the federal government (McRoberts, 1988).

Two years later, another attempt was made at bringing Quebec into the Canadian constitution. Much like the Meech Lake Accord, the 1992 proposal would have given Quebec special status in Canada as a distinct society and certain numerical guarantees of political and judicial representation in the federal government. In a national referendum, Canadians rejected the proposal by 60 to 40 percent. Temporarily, this seemed to put to rest the issue of Quebec sovereignty, but the forces in Quebec working for independence were given renewed strength and promised to put the issue before Quebecers again.

The opportunity for a revisit to the issue came in 1994 when the Parti Québecois was elected once again. The party leaders had made the sovereignty issue, as before, the core of their electoral program. As in the past, their message was familiar: Quebec would never be afforded the kind of unique place in the Canadian confederation that would allow it to protect and promote its language and culture; thus, political independence was the only logical alternative. To temper the uncertainties of separation, however, Quebecers were promised that after separation, the province would be able to continue to interact closely with the rest of Canada in economic matters such as trade and use of a common currency. Canadian federal leaders warned Quebecers against making such an assumption. The Parti Québecois promised to present the issue to Quebecers soon after the election, and in October 1995—fifteen years after the 1980 proposal was defeated—a referendum on sovereignty was once again held in the province.

As in 1980, the measure was defeated, but this time by the barest of margins—50.6 percent to 49.4 percent. A closer analysis of the results revealed that Francophones in the province had supported the separatist proposal by 60 percent to 40 percent, while Anglophones and Allophones (immigrants speaking neither French nor English) had roundly voted against the measure by over 90 percent. The closeness of the vote and the inability of the federal government to mollify the concerns of those supporting separatism seemed to augur another referendum on Quebec sovereignty in the near future.

Although leaders of the Parti Québecois have vowed to present to Quebecers another opportunity to vote on the issue of sovereignty through another referendum, the current political climate does not seem to favor it. Public opinion polls in 2001 indicated that the issue of sovereignty was a very low priority for Quebecers. Moreover, when asked how they would vote if a referendum were held on the question of separation, only 39 percent said they would vote yes; 62 percent would vote no, the lowest support for sovereignty in twenty years (Mackie, 2001). Quebecers even expressed a stronger sense of Canadian identity. Only 15 percent described themselves solely as Quebecers; most characterized themselves as both Quebecers and Canadians. Also it seems clear that even those who currently favor sovereignty are prepared only to accept a sovereign Quebec that would maintain a close association with Canada (Center for Research and Information on Canada [CRIC], 2002).

The sovereignty issue has for the moment been pushed into the background, but this by no means assures that it will not resurface with great force at some point in the future. Indeed, the intransigence of an element of Quebec society to accept nothing short of political independence, as well as the low-level animosity that seems so often to define the relations between Quebec and English Canada, promise to push the issue forward again eventually. As one observer has put it, the issue of Quebec separation may simply remain "a recurrent component of the Canadian agenda" (Banting, 1992:161).

Language Although Quebec remains, perhaps tenuously, part of Canada, the policies prompted by the ongoing separatist movement have created certain basic changes in the political and social status of French Canadians within Quebec and within the society as a whole. In one way or another, all of these policies revolve around the issue of language. In Quebec itself, the most far-reaching measures prompted by the movement have involved the primary use of French in all spheres of public life—including, most important, business and education. Because language continues to evoke such strong emotions on both sides and so thoroughly encompasses all facets of division and hostility between English-speaking Canadians and Quebecers, let's briefly review the issue as it has evolved in the past twenty-five years.

Language is the very foundation of any people's culture. Hence, it was long felt that assimilation into the dominant English-Canadian society would be inevitable for French Canadians if measures were not taken to assure the preservation of the French language. Moreover, language for the French Canadians, as for many ethnic collectivities in multiethnic societies, is the key symbolic marker setting them off from other groups. Quite simply, that they speak French is what most essentially defines the uniqueness of the French Canadians. As Lévesque put it, "Everything else depends on this one essential element and follows from it or leads us infallibly back to it" (1968:14). It would not be overstating the case to assert that the question of language was at the core of all historical divisions between English and French Canada from the time of the British conquest. It is no less so today.

In the 1970s, aggressive pro-French language policies were enacted by successive Quebec governments. These policies must be seen in the context of *la survivance*, the survival of the French-Canadian culture. French Canadians in the 1970s were faced with an overarching demographic problem: How could they remain a numerical majority in their own province? This problem was created by two population trends—a lowered birthrate and the influx of non-French-speaking immigrants. Quebec had historically maintained the highest birthrate in Canada. Thus, even though few immigrants from France were attracted to Quebec after the colonial period, the ratio of French to English in Canada held relatively constant for two centuries. This was derisively referred to as the

"revenge of the cradle," the implication being that the complete English conquest was foiled by the high French birthrate. Quebec's extraordinarily high birthrate, however, dropped dramatically in the 1960s, becoming the lowest in all of Canada. In addition to this precipitous fall, the arrival of large numbers of European immigrants, most adopting English as their new language, threatened to further dilute the Francophone population.

In the late 1960s, the federal government under Trudeau began to promote the notion of a truly bilingual Canada. Responding to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which had been charged with studying how a more equitable balance could be established between the two founding peoples, the government adopted and avidly supported a policy of official bilingualism. But this effort was seen as essentially meaningless to Quebecers, who in many cases were already bilingual—of necessity. Even today, it is only in Quebec where bilingualism is characteristic of a large percentage (over one-third) of the population. Although 17 percent of the total Canadian population is able to converse in both English and French, over half of these bilinguals live in Quebec (Statistics Canada, 1997). Moreover, it was the French language that served as the very basis of a distinct French-Canadian society and, as Dale Thomson notes, "the equality of French and English was incompatible with that goal" (1995:76).

The first move in the direction of French-language preeminence in Quebec came in 1974, when the Liberal provincial government of Robert Bourassa instituted a new language law, declaring French the official language of the province and making access to any but French-language schools difficult for those whose native tongue was not English. This created strong opposition from Montreal's English business community as well as the city's large number of European immigrants, who sought to maintain their right to choose the language of instruction for their children. Neither was the measure acceptable to the separatists, who felt that it did not go far enough in establishing the primacy of the French language. In 1977, therefore, Lévesque's government enacted a far more sweeping and radical language law, Bill 101, which mandated that French would be the prime, if not sole, language used not only in official matters but also in commerce and industry. Limitations on the rights of parents to educate their children in English were also made more stringent.

The aim of the new language law was to alter the structure of opportunity in favor of Francophones, who it was felt had been kept in a subordinate position by the Anglophone business elite. Legendre (1980) explains that the use of the language issue as the spearhead for Francophone control of the economy reflected a basic difference in philosophy between the Parti Québecois leadership of the 1970s and the leadership of the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s. Whereas the latter saw the past failure of Francophones to improve their economic status as the result of an outdated and ill-focused educational system as

well as the continued adherence to traditional values, the new leaders placed the blame more fundamentally on the structure of Quebec's economy, which fostered institutional discrimination against Francophones. Requiring the use of French in business and industry, it was felt, might attack the Anglophone domination of economic institutions directly. No longer could managerial positions be denied Quebecers on the basis of language.

The response of the English-dominated business world of Montreal was indignation. Rather than acquiescing to the stringent new language regulations, many large corporations chose to move their offices to Toronto and other Canadian cities or at least to limit their Montreal operations. This proved economically costly to the province.

Even more controversial was the effect of the language law on Quebec's educational system. Restrictions on instruction in English prompted an out-migration of Anglophones. But the law's primary target, many believed, was the large European immigrant population in Montreal whose mother tongue was neither French nor English (Arnopoulos and Clift, 1980; Levine, 1990). Most of these groups had ordinarily chosen English-language schools for their children, believing that in the North American context, fluency in English would afford them greater occupational and status opportunities. Under the new law, however, almost all were now required to send their children to French schools. Because most immigrants as well as the English community in Quebec resided in Montreal, the conflict centered primarily in that city.

Montreal continues to be the focal point of the language issue (Thomson, 1995). However, the context of the issue has been fundamentally changed. Despite periodic controversies, clearly, the primacy of the French language in Quebec is no longer disputed.

French-Canadian Ethnic Identity French Canadians are not simply one more ethnic group within the Canadian mosaic. The French in Canada are a people with a linguistic and cultural autonomy formally recognized from the very founding of the society. Moreover, unlike other Canadian ethnic groups, French Canadians maintain a territorial base. For Canada's French-speaking people who live outside the province of Quebec, the tendencies toward assimilation into the dominant English-speaking society are very evident (Joy, 1972). More important, the contemporary nationalist movement in Quebec has jettisoned these French-speaking non-Quebecers. It is Quebec alone that has become, in the eyes of the separatists, the only meaningful base for a sovereign French-speaking society in North America.

Manifestations of ethnic identity among Quebecers also illustrate their uniqueness within the Canadian ethnic system. Unlike English Canadians, French Canadians—specifically, those in Quebec—are faced with a dual national identity. Whereas those outside Quebec think of themselves simply

as "Canadians," French Canadians are both Canadiens and Québecois (Quebecers).[3] In recent decades, the latter identity has, for most, seemed to take precedence (CRIC, 2002). This dual identity, however, demonstrates well the idea of a unique French-Canadian nation in which people's allegiance and consciousness of kind do not focus necessarily on the same national unit perceived by other Canadians (Brunet, 1969). One must keep in mind, of course, that there are different degrees of nationalism among Quebecers. Some are vehemently and radically nationalistic and are unrelenting advocates of separatism, whereas others see themselves more as part of a unified Canada.

There is great irony in the desire today of many Quebecers for full independence from the Canadian federation, for there is no longer any question of the dominance of the French language in Quebec. Moreover, never before has Quebec achieved such great economic development, and at no other time have Quebecers played such a strong role in the federal government. The crux of the problem, however, is a view of Canada—and thus Quebec's place within it—that is very different from the view of English-speaking Canadians. The latter conceive of Canada as a nation of individual citizens who are equal before the law, regardless of their ancestors' language or ethnic origin, and who live in a federation of provinces with equal constitutional status. Quebecers, on the other hand, view Canada as a nation of collectivities defined primarily by language, specifically English and French (Bercuson, 1995). Because they are heavily outnumbered by English-speaking Canadians, most Quebecers feel that they are entitled to special status and not subject to the same institutions that are dominated by Anglophones. This leads to the view on the part of many that only independence can assure the survival of the French language and culture.

The consequences of the dual nationhood of Canada are not simply problems of identity and cultural maintenance. As we have already seen, there is a historical relationship in Canada between language and culture on the one hand and class, status, and power on the other. Indeed, it is precisely this relationship that in the past made French Canadians a minority group. We will look later at these patterns of ethnic stratification.

Canada's Other Ethnic Groups: The Third Force

Although the division between English and French Canadians overshadows all other ethnic issues, Canada today is far more ethnically diverse than is reflected

[3]The inhabitants of the original French colony in Canada called themselves *Canadiens*. Only later was the term *Canadian* adopted by the English. Hence, *Canadien* connotes, in the French-Canadian view, the idea of the original or true Canadians (see Brunet, 1969).

in this schism. Indeed, Canada is one of the most heterogeneous multiethnic societies in the world, and the noncharter groups stand out increasingly in the Canadian ethnic picture. As already noted, they affect the English-French schism on the issue of language; but perhaps more important, they comprise one-third of the total Canadian population and thus play an enormous role of their own in all aspects of ethnic relations and policy. They constitute an extremely diverse spectrum, including groups from all parts of Europe, East and Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Africa, and Latin America (Table 15.2). Americans, too, are among these groups, but they are hardly distinguishable except in a formal sense.

It is obvious that the size of these groups as well as their cultural variety have basically altered Canada's ethnic composition. To speak any longer of "English Canada" is a misnomer. Those who see themselves as British in origin continue to decline, and those whose ethnic origins are neither British nor French continue to comprise a greater and greater share of Canada's population. Today Canada is very much an immigrant society, particularly in its largest cities—Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. The changed ethnic profile of Toronto is especially dramatic. Immigrants today account for over 40 percent of the city's population, a higher percentage than any city in North America. It is not simply numbers, however, that demonstrate the profound changes occurring, but also the sources of immigrants to Toronto. Immigrants arriving before 1961 were almost exclusively people born in the United Kingdom and other European countries, like Italy and Germany. Since the 1960s, the number of European-born immigrants in Toronto has steadily decreased . By the late 1990s, those born in non-European countries made up six out of ten of all immigrants living in the metropolitan area; the Asian-born alone were over 36 percent of immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2001b).

The shaping of Canada's ethnic diversity can be seen historically as a process encompassing two major periods of immigration—the influx of peoples during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the post–World War II stream, which continues today. Each period differed in the origins of the major immigrant groups and in the groups' settlement patterns in Canada.

The Period of Western Settlement Although non-British and non-French groups had been present in Canada before the late nineteenth century, they were not large enough to make a significant impact on the society's ethnic composition. In 1871, of a total population of 3.7 million, the largest of these groups were the Germans, who numbered 200,000; others were considerably smaller (Hawkins, 1972). Throughout the nineteenth century, the British—English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish—dominated immigration and reinforced the Anglo-Canadian preeminence (exclusive of Quebec, of course), both numerically and culturally.

Table 15.2 Top 25 Ethnic Origins in Canada, Showing Single and Multiple Responses, 1996[a]

Ethnic Origin	Total Responses	Single Responses	Multiple Responses
1 Canadian[b]	8,806,275	5,326,995	3,479,285
2 English	6,832,095	2,048,275	4,783,820
3 French	5,597,845	2,665,250	2,932,595
4 Scottish	4,260,840	642,970	3,617,870
5 Irish	3,767,610	504,030	3,263,580
6 German	2,757,140	726,145	2,030,990
7 Italian	1,207,475	729,455	478,025
8 Aboriginal origins	1,101,955	477,630	624,330
9 Ukrainian	1,026,475	331,680	694,790
10 Chinese	921,585	800,470	121,115
11 Dutch (Netherlands)	916,215	313,880	602,335
12 Polish	786,735	265,930	520,805
13 South Asian origins	723,345	590,145	133,200
14 Jewish	351,705	195,810	155,900
15 Norwegian	346,310	47,805	298,500
16 Welsh	338,905	27,915	310,990
17 Portuguese	335,110	252,640	82,470
18 Swedish	278,975	31,200	247,775
19 Russian	272,335	46,885	225,450
20 Hungarian (Magyar)	250,525	94,185	156,340
20 Filipino	242,880	198,420	44,460
22 American	211,790	22,085	189,705
23 Spanish	204,360	72,470	131,895
24 Greek	203,345	144,940	58,405
25 Jamaican	188,770	128,570	60,200

Source: Statistics Canada, 1996.
[a]Data in this table are based on a 20 percent sample. Respondents who reported one ethnic origin are included in the single-response column. Respondents who reported more than one ethnic origin are included in the multiple-response column for each ethnic group they reported. For example, a respondent who reported "English and Scottish" is included in the multiple-response count for "English" and the multiple-response count for "Scottish." The total-response column indicates the number of respondents who reported each ethnic origin.
[b]Respondents were given the option of writing in their ethnic origin(s). Many, therefore, chose to identify themselves simply as "Canadian."

In the latter years of the century, spurred by the promotion of western settlement, large numbers of European immigrants were attracted to the prairie provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Alberta. Germans and, to a lesser extent, Dutch were the major immigrant groups until the early 1900s, when people from central and eastern Europe, especially Ukrainians, entered in large numbers. Americans, eager to acquire lands that were no longer available after the closing of the U.S. frontier, were also a significant immigrant group during this time (Troper, 1972).

Although immigrants did settle in Canada's cities, the objectives of nineteenth-century immigration policy were mainly to attract people who would develop the agricultural potential of the vast western domain. This did not mean an open-door policy, however. British peoples, or at least those from northwestern Europe, were deemed most desirable. Ukrainians and others from eastern and central Europe, though technically not among these, were recruited nonetheless because their agricultural background was considered more critical than their national origin. What the West needed above all were farmers; therefore, even nonconforming religious sects like Hutterites, Mennonites, and Doukhobors were promised parcels of land to settle, often as entire communities. Expressly rejected, however, were non-Europeans.

Post–World War II Immigration After World War II, the next great phase of immigration began, considerably changing the Canadian ethnic composition. Both their societies of origin as well as their Canadian destinations distinguished the new immigrant groups from those of previous eras.

Whereas British, northwestern European, and, selectively, central and eastern European groups had been the major immigrants of the past, the new arrivals were mainly from southern and eastern European countries, in addition to the continued large-scale entry of the British. The largest among the non-British groups were the Italians, almost a half million of whom had come by 1971 (Iacovetta, 1992).

The contemporary period of immigration also introduced an entirely new dimension to Canada's ethnic mosaic because it included for the first time nonwhite peoples in significant numbers. Although not officially stated, Canada's immigration policy before 1962 had been, in effect, "white only" (Hawkins, 1989; Richmond, 1976). Discriminatory measures favoring northwestern Europeans, particularly those from the British Isles, were now dropped, profoundly affecting the makeup of immigration. Whereas blacks and Asians before 1967 had constituted fewer than 4 percent of immigrants, by 1973 they were approximately one-third, and by 1981, one-half. As shown in Table 15.3, a broader immigration into Canada developed in the post–World War II era. Whereas European countries were the major source of immigrants in 1961, by

1971 East and South Asian countries were among the leading sources, a trend that was even more pronounced in the 1980s and 1990s.

Asian immigrants in the contemporary period have come from almost every country of the region, with especially large numbers of Chinese (from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the mainland), Filipinos, and Vietnamese, as well as large numbers of Indians, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, Lebanese, and Iranians. Blacks have come mostly from the Caribbean—especially Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Haiti—and have settled mainly in Toronto and Montreal (McGill Consortium, 1997). Before this period, most of Canada's tiny black population was of American origin. Most Canadian blacks during the colonial period had come with the American loyalists during the Revolutionary War or during the War of 1812, settling mainly in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick (Clairmont and Magill, 1974; Winks, 1971). Many American slaves also sought refuge in Canada before the Civil War via the Underground Railroad.

In addition to their diversity, the immigrants of the post–World War II era differed from those of previous eras in that their destinations were almost entirely urban; specifically, Canada's three major metropolises of Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. More than a third of all the new immigrants entered Toronto alone, making that city the core of Canada's new ethnic character. What had been a staid, conservative, and relatively provincial British-dominated city was transformed into a cultural and linguistic panorama not unlike American cities of the East and Midwest at the turn of the century.

Table 15.3 The Top Ten Countries of Canadian Immigrants

IMMIGRATED BEFORE 1961	RECENT IMMIGRANTS (2000)
United Kingdom	China
Italy	India
Germany	Pakistan
Netherlands	Sri Lanka
Poland	Philippines
United States	Korea
Hungary	Iran
Ukraine	United Arab Emirates
Greece	Russia
China	Jamaica

SOURCES: Employment and Immigration Canada, 1988; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2000.

As we will see, Canada's groups that are neither British nor French in origin have established themselves as an important political and social element in their own right, a so-called Third Force. Their growing numbers and diversity more than anything else have contributed to the current philosophy and government policy of multiculturalism, which is discussed later in this chapter.

Visible Minorities Nonwhite groups in Canada are referred to as visible minorities. The immigration of the past thirty years has moved Canada much further along these lines of ethnic development than at any time in the past. Excluding Aboriginal groups, the visible minority population makes up over 11 percent of the total Canadian population. As shown in Table 15.4, the largest groups are Chinese, South Asians (mostly from India), and blacks (mostly from the West Indies). It is expected that by 2016, visible minorities will make up 20 percent of the total Canadian population (Statistics Canada, 1996).

Aboriginal Peoples

The third major element in the Canadian ethnic picture is the native, or Aboriginal, groups, who together make up about 4 percent of the total population. Among these peoples are Native Indians (or First Nations), Inuit, and Métis, the last of mixed racial origins (Table 15.5).

Culture and physical features no longer define Native Indians in Canada; rather, "Indianness" is legally defined (Frideres, 1998). Canadian Indians are

Table 15.4 Visible Minority Population

	NUMBER	PERCENT
Total Canadian population	28,528,125	
Total visible minority population	3,197,480	100.0
Chinese	860,150	26.9
South Asian	670,590	21.0
Black	573,860	17.9
Arab/West Asian	244,665	7.7
Filipino	234,195	7.3
Latin American	176,975	5.5
Southeast Asian	172,765	5.4
Japanese	68,135	2.1
Korean	64,840	2.0
Multiple visible minority	61,575	1.9
Visible minority not included elsewhere	69,745	2.2

SOURCE: Statistics Canada, 2001A.

Table 15.5 Canadian Aboriginal Population

	SINGLE AND MULTIPLE ORIGINS
Indian (First Nations)	554,290
Métis	210,190
Inuit	41,080
TOTAL	799,010

SOURCE: Statistics Canada, 1996.

officially designated as "status" or "nonstatus." Status (or "registered") Indians, of whom there are about 600,000, have been classified as Indians under the Canadian Indian Act and are the direct responsibility of the federal government. About two-thirds live on reserves (the counterpart of reservations in the United States) established by the government. As in the United States, the Canadian First Nations are ethnically diverse and have long seen themselves as distinct peoples. It is their common relationship with the federal government, however, that links them together (Gibbins, 1997).

The Métis are marginal to both white and Native Indian societies. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, fur traders, mostly French, often lived with or married Indian women. The offspring of these mixed unions developed a unique culture, partly European and partly Indian. (*Métis* is a French word similar in meaning to the Spanish mestizo, "mixed.") In western Canada, where the intermixture occurred in a geographically and socially isolated environment, the Métis grew in number and developed a distinct ethnic identity, even declaring themselves a nation. Following an abortive rebellion in 1885, however, they became a highly stigmatized group. The Métis were recognized officially as a distinct people until 1940, when the Canadian government reversed this position. Today most Métis live in the Prairie provinces of Canada and a majority live in urban areas (Normand, 1996).

Canada's Inuit have remained relatively isolated geographically in the far North and historically have not been subject to colonization to the extent that Native Indians have. Thus, although they do qualify for special political status, technically they are not Indians.

Natives and Whites: Changing Relations Except for being markedly less violent, the historical relations between Canada's native peoples and white settlers have been, tragically, not essentially different from those that evolved in the United States. The technological superiority of the whites and their desire for land spawned policies and practices that led to deculturation, dependency, and

impoverishment among the Aboriginal populace. The history of native-white relations in Canada can be divided into pre- and postconfederation eras.

Accommodation characterized the white attitude toward native peoples from the time of initial contact until 1867. The indigenous peoples were vital to the fur trade, and as enterprises like the Hudson's Bay Company expanded their operations, Indians and Inuit were engaged in trapping. As they were drawn into this trade, they became increasingly dependent on the same companies for their subsistence; in the process, their traditional cultures were basically overturned. During this period, however, there was little direct intent by whites to impose their cultural ways on the native peoples. Their prime concern was profit maximization. As Breton et al. have put it, "The traders and whalers wanted productive trappers and hunters, not North American versions of themselves" (1980:73). White domination, then, was real though not necessarily deliberate.

With confederation and the western expansion, this general attitude of accommodation changed to one of domination. The federal government entered into treaties with the native peoples for the acquisition of occupied lands, and Indians were increasingly relegated to reserves, isolated from the mainstream society. The government subsequently assumed the role of patron, regulating various aspects of Indian life. Moreover, the reserves were increasingly incapable of supporting hunting and fishing economies, forcing Indians into an even greater dependence on the state.

Concurrent with government jurisdiction of reserve lands were efforts by missionary schools to assimilate natives into either the English or French culture, resulting in the denigration of indigenous cultures. Thus, while they were being more and more isolated from white society, they were expected to assimilate into the white culture (Breton et al., 1980). Indeed, until the 1970s, the goal of assimilation, though largely unsuccessful, had been the foundation of government policies toward native peoples since the nineteenth century (Gibbins, 1997).

In recent years, the native peoples of Canada have developed a resurgent group consciousness and pride and have become more politically mobilized in movements that seem to parallel those among Indians in the United States, with whom they share generally common origins and cultures. Viewing themselves as a colonized minority in Canada, they have sought the renegotiation of land claims, and in recent years, policies have been instituted that have led to greater native control over their reserves (Asch, 1984; Frideres, 1990; Ponting, 1997a). In a sense, the political movement among Aboriginal peoples in Canada has displayed many basic similarities to the Quebec nationalist movement. Each has sought greater freedom from the control of the federal government, and each has espoused an assertive and sometimes militant nationalism.

Several events occurred in the early 1990s that significantly altered the relations between Native Canadians and non-natives. All involved land claims. In

1989, in the small Quebec town of Oka, about twenty miles west of Montreal, the town council announced plans to expand its golf course to eighteen holes. To do that, however, they needed part of a disputed land area that included a Mohawk cemetery. In March 1990, Mohawks resisted by occupying the area, and after Quebec provincial police moved on the occupying group, one policeman lay dead. The siege then spread as Mohawks blocked the Mercier Bridge, part of a freeway into Montreal used as a major commuter artery. Before a settlement was reached, the occupation by Mohawks lasted several months and involved the eventual deployment of 4,000 Canadian troops and hundreds of Quebec provincial police. The confrontation provoked strong protest across Canada not only among Indians but also among many prominent Canadians, who condemned the government's actions in the affair and its failure to negotiate with the Mohawks (Wright, 1992). This was an agonizing affair for Indian-white relations in Canada and sparked a public awareness of the land claims and political status of Native Indians. It also contributed strongly to the growing sense of solidarity among Indians not only in Canada but across North America. A series of confrontations between Native Indians and government authorities occurred again in the summer of 1995 across Canada, over issues ranging from fishing rights to land claims.

An important event in 1993 moved some of those claims to actualization. The federal government signed an agreement with Inuit leaders that provided for the creation of a new territory called Nunavut ("our land" in the Inuit language), to be carved out of the Northwest Territories. Under the terms of the agreement, beginning in 1999, Inuit were given effective control of 135,000 square miles (one-fifth of Canada's landmass) and the equivalent of about $1 billion over a fourteen-year period (Légaré, 1997; Stout, 1997). Although the creation of Nunavut had no bearing on the movement for self-government among Native Indians of southern Canada, it nonetheless marked an important step in giving back control of land to indigenous Canadians.

Two events occurred in the late 1990s that augur additional significant changes in the relations between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada. First, the Canadian government in 1998 offered an historic apology to native peoples for 150 years of paternalistic and sometimes racist treatment. This represented an important symbolic gesture. More substantive, however, was an earlier Supreme Court ruling that validated Indian claims to land in British Columbia. The decision was based on oral histories presented by the Gitxsan tribe, not on written treaties. This ruling will likely have a profound effect on future treaty negotiations between First Nations and the federal and provincial governments and on decisions regarding land use and rights to timber and mining resources (DePalma, 1998).

Despite these positive signs in the relations between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada, recent national surveys indicate a growing proportion of

Canadians who believe that those relations are deteriorating. Moreover, in much of the country there is a declining view of the validity of Aboriginal land claims. For example, outside of Quebec, only a third of Canadians feel that Aboriginal peoples should enjoy special hunting and fishing privileges in their traditional living areas (CRIC, 2002).

ETHNIC STRATIFICATION

Because Canada is one of the most diverse multiethnic societies of the modern world, it would be foolish to expect it not to exhibit a system of ethnic stratification. One looking superficially at Canadian society, however, might be hard put to perceive such a system. Looking at the ethnic composition of the political elite, for example, it is obvious that Quebecers commonly serve in the highest-ranking positions of the federal government, including prime minister. Or, looking at ethnic patterns of housing, it is clear that neighborhoods thoroughly segregated on the basis of race and ethnicity, so common to American cities, are not part of the Canadian urban scene. But to see these cases as proof of the absence of dominant-minority relations is misguided, for there is indeed an ethnic hierarchy in Canada. In its basic outline, it is not unlike the ethnic stratification system of the United States: an Anglo-Canadian group dominant, other white ethnic groups and Asians in intermediate positions, and blacks and Aboriginals at the bottom.

The Vertical Mosaic

In a study that has become a classic of modern Canadian sociology, John Porter (1965) described the system of ethnic stratification in Canada as a "vertical mosaic." As he explained it, a strong relationship was evident between ethnicity and various measures of social class. The general pattern that emerged from his analysis was a three-part structure made up of British and French charter groups, the former at the top of the income and occupational hierarchies, followed by later-arriving European ethnic groups and, finally, native peoples. The notion of a vertical mosaic suggested that Canadian society was not only ethnically differentiated but was ethnically stratified as well. As his work proceeded, Porter explained, "The hierarchical relationship between Canada's many cultural groups became a recurring theme in class and power" (1965:xiii).

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1969 reaffirmed Porter's basic findings regarding the class hierarchy and revealed the concentration of particular ethnic groups in certain occupational areas. British, Jewish, and Asian groups were overrepresented in the managerial, professional, and technical occupations. Ukrainian, Scandinavian, Dutch, German, and Russian groups were overrepresented among farmers (a reflection of these groups'

significant presence in the agricultural provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta). And Italians, French, Polish, and Hungarians were noticeably over-represented among blue-collar workers (Porter, 1985; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969b).

The English-French Difference Perhaps the most glaring difference in class position, historically, was between the two charter groups—English and French. Whereas the English were traditionally at the top of the hierarchy, the French were no higher than most noncharter groups and actually lower than some.

Surprisingly, French Canadians traditionally occupied a lower collective economic position in Quebec, where they had always been a numerical majority, than in Canada as a whole. Porter found that in Quebec, "by and large the British run the industrial life" (1965:92). As occupational status rose, he noted, so did the proportion of English personnel. The tendency for French Canadians to fill the lower-level working-class positions in the Quebec economy had been vividly demonstrated over two decades earlier by Everett Hughes in his study of a Quebec town. In the town's major industries, Hughes found, the English held "all positions of great authority and perform[ed] all functions requiring advanced technical training" (1943:46). The French, by contrast, predominated in the lower occupational ranks and eventually disappeared in number as the degree of authority rose. "French Canadians as a group," noted Hughes, "do not enjoy that full confidence of industrial directors and executives that would admit them easily to the inner and higher circles of the fraternity—and fraternity it is—of men who run industry" (1943:53). Hughes concluded that the same situation prevailed throughout the province generally.

The English-French variance shown by Hughes and Porter was later corroborated by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. It was shown, for example, that in Quebec, over 30 percent of men of British origin were part of the professional and managerial occupational categories, compared with less than 15 percent of men of French origin.[4] This disparity was also apparent in wages. Canadians of French origin were shown to earn incomes that were on the average 20 percent lower than those of English Canadians. In Quebec, their incomes were 35 percent lower (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969a).

To see the historically lower place of the French Canadians in Quebec's economy and that of Canada as a whole as a product simply of discrimination by a powerful Anglo elite, however, is a gross oversimplification. The factors that created and sustained the lower occupational levels and incomes of French Canadians are complex and subject to much debate. Were they the result of the traditional

[4]Even as late as the early 1980s, only 26 of 165 enterprises in Quebec with an annual production in excess of $10 million were French-Canadian owned (McRoberts, 1988).

clerical emphasis on nontechnical and nonadministrative skills that permeated French-Canadian education until the 1960s? Were they the result of Francophone geographic concentration, making it difficult for French Canadians to move into English-speaking areas and to compete with English speakers? Was achievement motivation among the English and other ethnic groups different from that of the French Canadians? Did the basic power differential not permit the French to acquire the necessary capital to challenge English control of the economy? Elements of each of these explanations may be involved (Blishen, 1970; Fenwick, 1982; Levine, 1990; Porter, 1985; Richer and Laporte, 1979; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969a).

In the last three decades, these patterns have changed dramatically. The income discrepancies between Anglophones and Francophones have narrowed significantly, and occupational differences have declined. From an extensive study of mobility in Canadian society, Pineo and Porter (1985) concluded that there is little meaningful difference in the degree of equality of opportunity enjoyed by Francophones and Anglophones throughout Canada. But in Quebec specifically, the study found that Anglophones continue to be overrepresented in higher-ranked occupations. Even this situation appears to be changing as more Francophones assume professional, technical, and managerial positions in all sectors of Quebec's economy (Levine, 1990). Particularly striking changes have occurred at the elite level. As French has become the primary language of business and commerce, a new Francophone economic elite has emerged, making Anglophone dominance largely a phenomenon of the past (Forcese, 1997). "There is now a genuine Francophone capitalist class headquartered in Montreal," notes Marc Levine, "strongly influencing not only the Quebec economy, but also emerging as powerful actors in the entire North American economic system" (1990:194). Most significant, the state-run hydroelectric power industry, Quebec's most important, is thoroughly Francophone at all managerial levels.

Ethnicity and Class in Canada Today Although the historically consistent pattern of English-Canadian dominance of the higher occupational ranks and the most important decision-making positions of Canada's major institutions remains apparent, it is not the dominance of the past. The requirements of a postindustrial economy have created a more ethnically varied workforce at all occupational levels. Thus, even though collective differences among the various ethnic groups remain evident, ethnic inequality in Canada is declining (Brym, 1989; Darroch 1979; Isajiw et al., 1993; Lautard and Guppy, 1990; Pineo and Porter, 1985). "The relationship between ethnic origin and class position is in flux," concludes one study, "and no ethnic group unequivocally dominates the Canadian class structure" (Nakhaie, 1995:187). Some, in fact, maintain that intergroup differences among white ethnic groups are now virtually nonexistent (Breton, 1989).

The large influx of non-British immigrants since World War II has provided further pressures to afford upward mobility and a greater share of power to minority Canadians. Some, like Jews and Asians, have experienced relatively rapid and substantial mobility into high occupational positions and incomes. Others, like southern and eastern European groups, have not exhibited such significant upward movement, though their overall occupational distribution has improved and become more like the national average (Breton et al., 1980; Brym, 1989; Nakhaie, 1995; Pineo and Porter, 1985). As with earlier European immigrants, the visible minority immigrant groups of recent years will likely experience upward social mobility at different rates (Breton, 1998).

Even at the elite level, the dominance of Anglo-Canadians appears to be eroding with the advent of a more ethnically diverse institutional leadership. In the past, non-British groups had been severely underrepresented in the power elites of major Canadian institutions (Clement, 1975; Kelner, 1970; Lautard and Guppy, 1990; Newman, 1975, 1979; Presthus, 1973). Today, elites in all major institutions—political, economic, educational, labor—are increasingly ethnically varied (Ogmundson and Fatels, 1994; Ogmundson and McLaughlin, 1992).[5]

Aboriginal groups merit a special note. Although their circumstances are much improved from earlier generations, they continue to occupy the lowest rung on all dimensions of social class and consequently have the poorest life chances of all Canadians. They exhibit the highest unemployment rates in the country, have the lowest levels of income and education, and disproportionately occupy low-level jobs. Unemployment among Aboriginals, for example, is three times higher than the national average (Frideres, 1998). The standard of living on Indian reserves is characterized by poor and overcrowded housing, extremely low incomes, and low participation in the labor force (Ponting, 1997b; Siggner, 1986). For Indians who migrate to the cities, a social pattern has developed that is similar to that of American urban Indians—high unemployment, high criminality, and high alcoholism (Frideres, 1993; Statistics Canada, 1993).

The social consequences of these conditions are predictable. Life expectancy rates are considerably lower, and infant mortality rates, though declining, remain higher among Canadian Indians than among the general Canadian populace (Barsh, 1994; Frideres, 1998; Norris, 1990). Standards of housing, education, nutrition, and general health remain below the national averages (Barsh, 1994; Blue, 1985; Frideres, 1998; Kendall, 2001; Siggner, 1986; Statistics Canada, 1993). Moreover, Aboriginal people make up a highly disproportionate number of inmates in Canadian prisons. Although less than 4 percent of Canada's population, they account for about 12 percent of male and 17 percent of female con-

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[5]The class and ethnic origins of Canadian elites, however, remain a contested issue among social scientists. See Ogmundson (1990) and Clement (1990).

victs in federal penitentiaries. In provincial prisons, the figures are even higher. In Saskatchewan, where Aboriginals account for 13 percent of the population, they make up almost 70 percent of prisoners (Stackhouse, 2001).

Despite these chilling facts, in both income and education, Indians have clearly raised their status relative to the total Canadian population. In 1971, for example, only 3 percent of Indians had attained some postsecondary education; by 1991, almost 34 percent had done so (Ponting, 1997b; Siggner, 1986). In sum, the life chances of native peoples in Canada have improved, but they continue to represent a markedly deprived segment of the society and, in many ways, are divorced from mainstream institutions.

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

When comparing their own country with their American neighbor in the conduct and character of ethnic relations, Canadians usually see themselves in a favorable light. The prevalent view is that their treatment of and attitudes toward minority ethnic groups have been and remain more tolerant and equitable. This popular Canadian perspective is in some regards valid. Though incidents of racial and ethnic violence are scattered throughout Canadian history, they have never reached the magnitude, frequency, or intensity of ethnic violence in the United States. Moreover, as we will see in the following section, an ethnic ideology more pluralistic in content has traditionally been proclaimed in which the society's various cultural groups have not been forced into a monolithic "Canadian" mold. That there have in essence been two Canadian nations, English and French, no doubt played an important role in establishing and sustaining this seemingly greater tolerance of ethnic diversity.

Despite its more subdued character, however, ethnic conflict in Canada has been revealed in patterns that are in some ways parallel to those of the United States. Like most other Western societies, Canada does not lack a racist tradition, though it has been more muted in expression and less malignant in consequence. Historically, Canadian racism has been evidenced in its immigration policies and in its treatment, both official and unofficial, of nonwhites. Indeed, prejudice and discrimination have traditionally been aimed primarily at the visible minorities and only secondarily at white ethnic minorities. It is those groups who have borne the brunt of negative attitudes as well as individual and institutional forms of discrimination.

Also, in its ethnic attitudes and actions, Canada at times takes its cue from the United States. For example, following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, a number of anti-Muslim incidents, some of them violent, occurred in Canada, as they did in the United States. And on the issue of immigration, after the attacks, over 83 percent of the

population held the view that Canadian immigration should be made more restrictive (Leger Marketing, 2001).

Immigration and Racism

Historian Howard Palmer has written that "the more one scratches the surface of the period up to 1920, the more difficult it becomes to differentiate between the immigration histories of Canada and the United States" (1976:499). Official government policies regarding who and how many would be admitted and what place they would take in the occupational structure, as well as nativist sentiments and attitudes toward immigration in general, were all basically similar.

One important aspect of the early history of immigration in both Canada and the United States was the decidedly racist character of the selection process. Like the dominant Anglo group in the United States, "English Canadians," notes Evelyn Kallen, "have, from the beginning, exercised control of federal immigration policies responsible for determining which ethnic groups would be allowed into Canada, where they would settle, what jobs they could assume, and what ranking and social position would be accorded them within the existing system of ethnic stratification" (1995:131). Those deemed most suitable for Canada were thus, not surprisingly, most like the English Canadians, culturally and physically.

After 1870, when large-scale immigration to Canada began, the preference for British, or at least northwestern European, immigrants was an outspoken national policy. The pretext for this selectivity was the matter of assimilation. Those from Britain and culturally similar societies, it was asserted, were more easily absorbed into the mainstream Canadian society. Others were not culturally or, as some believed, biologically fit.

That prejudice and discrimination against southern and eastern European groups are no longer significant should not imply that they have no heritage in Canada. In fact, Italians, Jews, and other such groups—especially those who immigrated into Canadian cities at the turn of the century—met with a brand of nativism very similar to the U.S. variety (Avery, 1979; Harney and Troper, 1977). But it was nonwhites, specifically Asians, who were least welcome and against whom the most blatantly racist policies and actions were directed.

The Chinese were the major target group. They had been permitted entry into Canada as workers in the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Once this project was completed, however, they became a surplus labor force, seen by white workers and organized labor as an economic threat. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, discriminatory policies were enacted to discourage their entry, and in 1923 an exclusionary act totally barred their immigration (Elliott, 1979). Other restrictive measures severely limited entry into Canada of those deemed "unassimilable," understood to mean nonwhites. In 1911, for

example, blacks seeking to emigrate from the United States were rejected because they were presumably unable to adapt to Canada's harsh winters (Palmer, 1976).

Discriminatory immigration policies restricting Asians and other nonwhites were not basically changed until the 1960s. Indeed, as recently as 1947, Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated bluntly Canada's intention to encourage population growth through selective immigration. Large-scale Asian immigration, he stated, "would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population"; therefore, no changes in immigration regulations were to be made (Corbett, 1957:36).

Seeking to enhance its international image and to more realistically meet its need for human resources, Canada abolished its racially discriminatory immigration policy in legislative acts of 1962 and 1967. The selection of immigrants was no longer to be based on nationality or race but on a system of points that objectively evaluated each immigrant's potential economic and social contribution to Canadian society (Hawkins, 1989). As in the United States after it discarded restrictive immigration quotas in 1965, the ethnic origins of immigrants entering Canada changed radically—most were now non-European.

Ethnic Attitudes

As we have seen, Canada in the last three decades has become a society far more ethnically diverse than at any time in its history, with many of the newcomers among the visible minorities. This has prompted attitudes and actions that, though mild by American standards, indicate some degree of racism. Such patterns, of course, are not of recent vintage. In addition to the virulent anti-Asian feelings of an earlier period, whites' generally abusive interrelations with native groups as well as episodes of anti-Semitism have resembled American historical patterns (Henry and Tator, 1985). Studies of social distance, however, indicate that Canadian racial attitudes remain somewhat less intense than those of Americans.

In their national attitudinal study, Berry, Kalin, and Taylor (1977) found that respondents in general reacted very favorably to English and French Canadians but less favorably to non-British and non-French groups. Specifically, northwestern Europeans were judged most favorably, central and southern European groups next, and nonwhite groups least favorably, except for Japanese. This social distance scale has been demonstrated by other studies as well (Mackie, 1980; Pineo, 1987). It is interesting to observe its essential similarity to the ethnic scale that, as noted in Chapter 3, has been consistently reaffirmed in the United States, though the differences among groups are declining in both societies (Reitz and Breton, 1994).

Despite this clear acknowledgment among Canadians of an ethnic hierarchy, Berry and his colleagues found no evidence of extreme ethnic prejudice. Though

the rank order of groups was very apparent, the differences among them were not exceedingly great. Race (that is, physical differences among groups) was found to be an important dimension of group perception among Canadians, but the researchers concluded that "Canadians reject explicit racism" (1977:206). Later studies reaffirmed this conclusion (Berry and Kalin, 2000; Kalin and Berry, 1994). Bibby's surveys (1995) indicate increasing ethnic tolerance on several measures, including intermarriage and perceptions of visible minorities. Acceptance of marriage between whites and blacks, for example, rose from 57 percent in 1975 to 81 percent in 1995.

Despite the evident lower level of racism among Canadians, at least by U.S. standards, some suggest that Canadian prejudice, especially toward nonwhites, may simply be more subtle and covert and may reveal itself when carefully probed (Frideres, 1976; Kallen, 1995).

Discriminatory Actions

Although the overt suppression of minority peoples is generally lacking in Canadian history, there are nonetheless some parallels between Canada and the United States in the treatment of ethnic minorities, particularly nonwhites. In Canada, these racial-ethnic groups have suffered various forms of discrimination including, at one time or another, restrictions in voting, employment, land ownership, housing, and public accommodations (Davis and Krauter, 1971; Kallen, 1995).

Arrant anti-Asian immigration measures were noted earlier. In addition to this official discrimination, violence against Chinese and Japanese workers in British Columbia was common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most blatant discriminatory action against Asians, however, occurred during World War II. As in the United States, those of Japanese origin were forcibly removed from their homes and businesses and placed in internment camps for the duration of the war (Adachi, 1976).

Serious racist actions have also been directed at people of East Indian origin. Along with the Chinese and Japanese, East Indians were barred from entry into Canada earlier in the century, and those remaining were subjected to discrimination in almost all areas of social life. East Indians in the past were seen as intrinsically dirty, sinister, immoral, prone to overcrowding, and generally inferior to whites. Buchignani suggests that East Indians in Canada before World War II were "an almost ideal type subordinate racial caste" (1980:129). They were denied entry into various occupational fields and could not vote or hold citizenship. Today there are almost 700,000 East Indians and other South Asians in Canada, and, while serious discrimination against them rarely surfaces, well-worn negative stereotypes do at times come to

light (Berry, Kalin, and Taylor, 1977; Henry, 1978; Henry et al., 1995; Ramcharan, 1982; Statistics Canada, 1999).[6]

Blacks have never made up a significant element of Canada's ethnic population; today they are about 2 percent (Statistics Canada, 1999). Although their circumstances have in some ways conformed to those of American blacks, negative actions and attitudes toward blacks in Canada have never equaled in scope and intensity U.S. patterns. A study of urban housing, for example, revealed that blacks in Canadian cities do not experience similar levels of residential segregation, as is so common in the United States (Fong, 1996). As with other ethnic minorities, of course, immigration restrictions and discrimination in schools, housing, and public accommodations were once common features of the Canadian black experience (Walker, 1980). Today, however, the official and obtrusive forms of discrimination of the past have given way to milder and more subtle forms that are not easily verified (Bolaria and Li, 1988; Henry, 1994; Henry et al., 1995; Hill, 1977; Thompson and Weinfeld, 1995).

The 1990s produced a number of incidents that may augur more serious problems for Canada's visible minorities. These have been limited primarily to Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, where, because of immigration, nonwhites constitute an increasing presence. In Montreal, with a growing black population made up primarily of immigrants from the Caribbean, especially Haiti and Jamaica, charges of police brutality against blacks surfaced several times, and other racially inspired incidents arose with some frequency (Farnsworth, 1995). Police relations with blacks were a source of considerable tension in Toronto, and in Vancouver, where most immigrants have been Asian, a backlash against newcomers from Hong Kong was evident (Farnsworth, 1991; Katz, 1992; McGraw, 1990). The frequency of hate crimes, directed mostly at visible minorities and Jews, has also increased in recent years (Corelli, 1995; Wood, 1998).

Such episodes prompt serious consternation among those who have viewed ethnic discrimination as uncharacteristic of Canadians. In 1974 Hughes and Kallen explained that "Canadians, consciously or unconsciously, attempt to boost their feelings of self- and national identity by contraposing their 'peaceful and just' society to that of their 'violent and racist' neighbour to the south" (1974:213). A national survey taken twenty years later indicated the continuing strength of that attitude (Dwyer, 1994). Whether there are fundamental differences between Canadian and American beliefs and actions toward nonwhite peoples, however, remains a debated issue. Reitz and Breton (1994) suggest that when black-white relations are put aside, the differences between Canada and

[6] A number of physical attacks against East Indians occurred in the 1970s in some of Canada's largest cities (Ferrante, 1977; Hill, 1977; Pitman, 1977).

the United States regarding racial and ethnic tolerance are not great. They cite the cases of the historical treatment of native peoples as well as the treatment of Japanese Canadians during World War II, which they see as fairly similar in the two societies.[7]

STABILITY AND CHANGE

As a multiethnic society, Canada in some ways faces even greater problems in seeking societal unification among its various ethnic groups than does the United States. But the attempts to solve these problems do not necessarily resemble those of the United States, because Canada is more pluralistic in its ethnic ideology. The ethnic end product envisioned by Canadians is not a duplicate of that envisioned by Americans. Whereas the United States can be categorized as more assimilationist than pluralistic in orientation (more so, of course, for white ethnic groups than for nonwhites), Canada displays many elements of a corporate pluralistic society.

Melting Pot versus Mosaic

It has often been noted that one of the key factors differentiating the Canadian and American ethnic systems is how the two societies regard relations among diverse groups and the eventual absorption of these groups into the larger society. Canada has commonly been observed as a society in which ethnic group differences are tolerated more than in the United States. The popular phrases of comparison are *melting pot*, supposedly characteristic of the United States, and *mosaic*, supposedly characteristic of Canada.

The Melting Pot In the United States, as we saw in Chapter 5, the idea of the melting pot—the fusing of many immigrant groups into an American hybrid culture—became popular beginning in the early 1900s. Never, however, was it translated into public policy to any serious extent. In reality, the expectation was always that immigrants would conform to the dominant Anglo-Protestant culture. Even in recent years, the assumption that new groups will quickly learn English and generally adopt dominant norms and values has continued to guide social thinking despite increased pluralistic rhetoric.

The Mosaic The Canadian ideology, in contrast, has historically favored a more pluralistic outcome of the massing of various ethnic groups. There have been and

[7]It is of note that a national poll conducted in 1992 indicated a public perception of growing racial intolerance in Canada (Bozinoff and MacIntosh, 1992).

remain greater awareness and tolerance of ethnic separateness. A simplified view is "unity in diversity." Canada, in this ideal view, is a mosaic, the various pieces fitting together within a common political and economic framework. What has accounted for this mosaic ideology, and how valid is it in light of the reality of Canadian ethnic relations?

To begin with, the dual national character of Canada has made ideas of ethnic assimilation problematic. Given the historical fact of two founding groups, neither the melting pot nor the Anglo-conformity model could have the same meaning in the Canadian context as in the American. The question is, how can ethnic groups assimilate into the dominant culture and society when there are two dominant groups? The idea of "Canadianizing" people becomes an empty notion when there is no uniform "Canadian way of life" to serve as a societal reference point. As Hiller writes, "If one group had dominated, there would have been more accord about the specific nature of the dominant culture; but since the British and French were in conflict themselves, the society had a greater built-in tolerance for the perpetuation of ethnic identities" (1976:107–8).

Although it is also true that one would be hard put to clearly define an "American way of life," there is nonetheless no essential ambiguity with regard to language and other major elements of American culture. In Canada, however, the presence of two founding peoples with distinctly different cultural systems has allowed ethnic groups that entered the society after the British and French to parlay this basic schism into significant freedom to retain their culture and group structure.

Some have suggested that one explanation for Canada's greater tolerance of ethnic pluralism lies in the fact that Canada has historically retained a more aristocratic and particularistic social system, in contrast to the equalitarian and universalistic system of the United States (Clark, 1950; Lipset, 1968, 1990). A traditionally greater emphasis on hierarchy and status has restrained pressures to melt down group differences. The necessity for ethnic groups in the United States to "become like others" has therefore not found a strong counterpart in Canada.

Finally, the impact of immigrant groups on Canadian society has in a way been even more profound than their impact in the United States, making assimilation extremely challenging in any case. Though not as numerous in an absolute sense, immigrants in Canada have been a considerably higher percentage of the population than immigrants in the United States. In the early years of this century, the foreign-born in some Canadian provinces outnumbered the native-born by two to one (McKenna, 1969). Since World War II as well, the relative impact of large-scale immigration on Canada has been greater than on the United States. Today, whereas the foreign-born in the United States are about 10 percent of the total population, in Canada they are 16 percent.

In comparing the ethnic ideologies of Canada and the United States, it is important to recognize that just as the American melting pot has been more myth

than reality, so, too, the Canadian ethnic mosaic is not a true reflection of public attitude and policy toward ethnic differences. For both societies, the reality of ethnic relations lies somewhere between these two ideals. As Porter points out, "In practice neither [ideal] has been practicable and neither has been particularly valued by the respective societies despite the rhetoric in prose and poetry that has been devoted to it" (1979:144). Just as Anglo-conformity was the dominant public policy with respect to ethnic groups in the United States after its emergence as a heterogeneous society in the late nineteenth century, so, too, in Canada the first period of heavy immigration at the turn of the century produced an ethnic policy that encouraged assimilation into the dominant Anglo-Canadian group. This basic policy did not change for the next three decades (Burnet, 1976, 1981; Palmer, 1976). Although immigrants entered a society in which assimilation could not be enforced as strongly as it was in the United States, there was never any question that Anglo-conformity was, except in Quebec, the guiding force of government policy toward the newcomers.

In a comparison of ethnicity in the two societies, Reitz and Breton (1994) suggest that the differences between Canada and the United States regarding assimilation, at least as it pertains to European-origin groups, are today not as great as has been commonly assumed. "The fact is," they note, "in both Canada and the United States, the public discourse on immigration reflects both a tolerance for diversity and a bias toward assimilation" (1994:10). Moreover, their analysis suggests there is no evidence to support the notion that ethnic minorities in Canada retain their ethnic identity and culture longer or more strongly than American ethnic minorities. In Canada, as in the United States, ethnicity declines in significance with each passing generation, taking on a largely symbolic function.

Multiculturalism in the Modern Era

The post–World War II changes in Canadian society, especially the influx of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from various nations, created the setting for a more robust ethnic mosaic than had existed at any previous time. In the 1960s, Canada experienced a flurry of ethnic activity and an upsurge in ethnic consciousness, much as did the United States and many other Western societies.

The chief catalyst of these tendencies was the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and the subsequent rise of Quebec nationalism. The appointment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to study ways of reconciling the age-old but newly freshened rift between the two Canadas, English and French, reflected the acknowledgment of a society faced with a powerful and potentially destructive ethnic conflict. The commission supported ways of strengthening the bilingual and bicultural character of the society and of equalizing the place of English and French cultures.

But the non-British and non-French groups, the other major element in the Canadian ethnic amalgam, were not content with the commission's recommendation that Canada was and should remain a bicultural society. The special cultural and language privileges of the two founding groups were, they believed, being furthered in disregard of the historical and contemporary role of other Canadian ethnic groups. Also being ignored was that these groups now constituted almost one-third of the total population. In their view, they had been relegated to the status of second-class citizens. Hence, this so-called Third Force demanded not a *bi*cultural but a *multi*cultural Canada, in which the retention of a unique ethnic culture would be recognized and supported not only for the French but also for all other ethnic groups.

The Royal Commission subsequently added to its report a volume dealing with Canada's non-British and non-French groups (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969b). In it, these groups' contribution to the Canadian mosaic was clearly acknowledged. The commission recommended that ethnic groups need not surrender their cultures to either Anglo or French Canada, but on the contrary should be encouraged, if they wished, to maintain them strongly (Burnet, 1976). In response, the federal government of Prime Minister Trudeau announced in 1971 the policy of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework." This appeared to be a compromise measure to satisfy the French concerns about language retention and the other ethnic groups' concerns about their cultural status. One important aspect of the policy was the awarding of grants to ethnic groups to help them preserve their cultures. An even stronger commitment to the policy was made in 1988 when Canada became the world's first country to enact a national multiculturalism law (Fleras and Elliott, 1992). Multiculturalism, then, was firmly established as a public doctrine and set of public policies that recognize, protect, and encourage the retention of ethnic cultures within the larger Canadian society (Elliott and Fleras, 1990; Hawkins, 1989).

Multiculturalism, however, has not been met with overwhelming enthusiasm. Many have seen it as merely part of a political strategy designed to gain the support of ethnic minorities. There also is concern that it is moving Canada away from its traditional open, individualistic political system toward one in which, as one observer has described it, "the cake has to be sliced very carefully among powerful and competing groups" (Hawkins, 1989:216). Moreover, the notion of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework has seemed to satisfy neither the non-English, non-French ethnic minorities nor the Quebec nationalists. The former argue that without protection and support of language rights (that is, multilingualism), multiculturalism is rendered meaningless because group culture cannot be sustained without the ethnic language (as the Quebecers have so effectively argued). The French in Quebec, on the other hand, argue that

multiculturalism at the national level reduces them from charter-group status to simply one more ethnic group in Canada (Rocher, 1976).[8]

There is general agreement that multiculturalism as a government policy has been at least symbolically beneficial in that Canada now officially celebrates its ethnic diversity and encourages the expression of unique ethnic cultures. Minority ethnic groups have established themselves as part of the Canadian identity and are now recognized in the school curriculum and in national patriotic events. "Tolerance towards diversity and the acceptance of pluralism," notes political commentator Richard Gwyn, "have become the defining characteristic of the country and its citizens" (1995:203). But in the final analysis, multiculturalism touches only the most superficial aspects of ethnic relations in Canada and does not speak to the more significant issues of ethnic inequality (the vertical mosaic) and of prejudice and discrimination toward the visible minorities.

Moreover, whether succeeding generations of minority ethnic groups in Canada can (or will want to) resist the forces of assimilation into the dominant Anglo culture seems doubtful. Some have pointed out that immigrants and their children are usually determined to take advantage of the opportunities of their new society rather than preserve the same kind of life they left in their societies of origin. For them, as Freda Hawkins has claimed, "the preservation of cultural heritage is a lesser concern and . . . the whole concept of multiculturalism can be confusing" (1989:217). Here the experience of white ethnic groups in the United States may be compared. Although at times tortuous, a high level of assimilation, both cultural and structural, has been the fate of most groups by the third generation. This seems to be the pattern followed as well by Canadian groups (Reitz and Breton, 1994). Moreover, assimilation expectations seem solidly part of the view of most Canadians. In 1975, 85 percent of Canadians agreed with the statement that "immigrants to Canada have an obligation to learn Canadian ways." Twenty years later the percentage agreeing was 88. Furthermore, this view was no less evident among those who had come to Canada since the 1960s, that is, immigrants themselves (Bibby, 1995).

Finally, not all see the aims of multiculturalism as socially beneficial. Some view it as divisive in effect and stultifying as well for minority ethnic groups (Porter, 1975, 1979). Sustaining and enhancing ethnic pluralism, they maintain, can only hinder the movement of these groups into mainstream institutions, thus perpetuating the system of ethnic stratification. Moreover, as writer Neil Bissoondath has pointed out, rather than instilling cultural understanding among ethnic groups, the policy of multiculturalism may actually have the opposite effect by reinforcing and perpetuating stereotypes. "Multiculturalism," he writes,

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[8]In recent years, however, Quebec, in light of its growing minority ethnic population, has adopted its own policy of multiculturalism, recognizing the unique needs of these ethnic subcultures while trying to integrate them into Quebec institutions (Levine, 1990).

“with all its festivals and celebrations, has done—and can do—nothing to foster a factual and clear-minded vision of our neighbours. Depending on stereotype, ensuring that ethnic groups will preserve their distinctiveness in a gentle and insidious form of cultural apartheid, multiculturalism has done little more than lead an already divided country down the path to further social divisiveness” (Bissoondath, 1994:89–90).

It is instructive to consider public opinion on this issue. In comparing mosaic and melting pot models, in 1985, 56 percent of Canadians said they preferred the mosaic, only 28 percent the melting pot. Ten years later, the preference for the mosaic had declined to 44 percent while the melting pot had risen to 40 percent (Bibby, 1995). The Canadian commitment to multiculturalism, then, is hardly firm and unequivocal.

The Future of Canadian Ethnic Relations

Canada is a North American experiment in ethnic pluralism. But the experiment is still very much in the testing stage, and its outcome is uncertain. In considering the future course of ethnic relations in Canada, we might return to the theme of the three ethnic dimensions denoted at this chapter’s outset.

The overriding ethnic issue of Canadian society remains, of course, the French-English schism. This is the most encompassing dimension of ethnicity in Canada and continues to present the most vexing problems of intergroup relations. Whether Quebec will retain its place in the Canadian union or eventually go the way of independence is a question that at the beginning of the twenty-first century remains unresolved. More than any other, this ethnic conflict will dominate internal politics in Canada in the coming years and, in a real sense, will define the future of Canada as a nation-state. Whether a politically and economically centralized society can sustain what are in essence two nations is a question that has been addressed in other corporate pluralistic societies of territorially based ethnic groups divided along the lines of language and culture. Judging from those cases, a continuing separatist movement of some scope can be expected as long as Francophone Quebec remains part of Canada.

The roots of English-French discord in Canada are, as we have seen, historically deep and abiding. But this is a conflict that, compared with the ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia or even black-white relations in the United States, is subdued. Whatever the nature of its resolution, it is not likely to degenerate into warfare or to erupt periodically in violence. The democratic context of Canada makes ethnic conflict amenable to political solution.

The second major issue concerns the place of the non-British, non-French groups in the Canadian ethnic order. Will multiculturalism become more than an appeasement to these groups and eventually translate into a real alteration of the ethnic hierarchy—affording them greater and eventually proportional

power, privilege, and prestige? As we have seen, this appears to be unmistakably the trend. Whether these groups will be able, or will choose, to preserve their ethnic cultures in a more corporate pluralistic society, however, is questionable. In any case, it is now clear that these groups have fundamentally altered the ethnic composition and flavor of Canada. As journalist Peter Newman has written, the members of Canada's two founding groups are no longer in the ascendancy, which means that "a new and radically different country has been created" (1995:34).

Another ethnic issue that will absorb the attention of Canadians in the next decade involves the racial and ethnic characteristics of its new immigrants—mostly non-European and nonwhite. This, as we have seen, is a critical ethnic issue in the United States as well. Although it is clear that Canada, with a very low birthrate, must continue to attract new immigrants in order to maintain its population, there is a growing restiveness over the shift in immigration patterns. Already the change in the racial and ethnic makeup of new immigrants has called into question public support for the official policy of multiculturalism. A 1989 national poll indicated that though 63 percent of Canadians supported the policy, 61 percent also felt that immigrants should change their distinct culture in order to "blend with the larger society." This response was even higher than the 51 percent of American respondents who, in a parallel poll, felt the same about new immigrants to the United States (*Maclean's*, 1989). A later national survey (Edwards and Hughes, 1995) revealed that nearly half of the Canadian public felt that Canada should accept fewer immigrants. In 2001, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack on the United States, 83 percent of Canadians thought that Canada "should be stricter when it comes to immigration" (Leger 2001).[9] As in the United States, attitudes toward immigration in Canada tend to vacillate with changing economic conditions. When the economy is strong and unemployment low, people tend to see immigration in a more positive light; when the economy is in recession, immigrants are perceived as a labor threat and public views take a negative turn (CRIC, 2002; Esses et al., 1999).

Finally, the place of Aboriginal peoples has yet to be clearly determined. Whether they will participate with other Canadians as equals in all aspects of citizenship or whether they will be granted greater autonomy is still an unfolding issue.

Canada will hold the attention of students of ethnic relations in the coming decades, for it may provide an answer to the question of how much diversity can be accommodated by a society that remains a centralized nation-state. Factors irrespective of ethnicity have hindered the development of a definitive Canadian national identity. Great regional differences as well as the constant specter of the United States, with its enormous economic and cultural influences, continue to

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[9]The same percentage, however, wanted Canada to remain open to people of Arab descent or Muslim faith.

Comparing Canada and the United States

Points of Similarity

- The ethnic development of both societies began with a process of migrant superordination, in which an indigenous population was overcome by a colonizing force. Following conquest, native populations in both societies were reduced to a state of dependence on the dominant group.
- Both societies were populated by successive immigrant waves. Current immigration in both societies is comparable in its societal impact. Both societies are among the major destinations of global immigration, and most immigrants are non-European, creating, in the process, a more heterogeneous society.
- Both societies are today among the most ethnically diverse in the world.

Points of Difference

- Canada is a two-nation society, with two distinct cultural groups having charter-group status. In effect, there are two dominant ethnic groups in Canada.
- Canada has adopted a more pluralistic approach to the absorption of various ethnic groups into its population, though in fact progressive assimilation of various ethnic groups has generally paralleled U.S. patterns.
- Canada did not abide slavery and thus did not experience the travails of integrating a former slave population into its mainstream.
- Race and ethnic relations in Canada have historically been more benign and ethnic tolerance higher than in the United States.

divide Canadian society and lead to divergent visions of the country's future. But above all, it is issues of ethnic diversity that today Canada must address in assuring its national survival.

SUMMARY

Canada is geographically and culturally close to the United States, but its ethnic structure is decidedly different in several respects. In its ethnic makeup, Canada is a dual-nation society, French and English, within which additional ethnic groups have taken their place. There are three dimensions of ethnicity in Canada: the French-English bifurcation; other ethnic groups, neither French nor English in origin; and Aboriginal peoples.

The overriding issue of ethnic relations is the relentless conflict between French and English Canadians. The division between the two derives from the French colonial defeat by the British in the eighteenth century. Conflict has revolved around the efforts of French Canadians to retain their language and culture within the context of a surrounding English majority. The rupture

intensified in the 1970s with the emergence of a separatist movement in Quebec, where most French Canadians live, and remains wide today.

A particularly large and varied cluster of non-British, non-French ethnic groups from virtually all nations of the world immigrated to Canada beginning in the late 1950s, changing the very ethnic character of the society. Today, these groups make up over one-third of the Canadian population.

Aboriginal peoples—Indians, Inuit, and Métis—are a numerically tiny element of the society.

Ethnic stratification in Canada was, in the past, a vertical mosaic in which those of British origin disproportionately occupied the higher occupations and the most important decision-making positions of major institutions. Today French Canadians and, increasingly, those of neither British nor French origin have narrowed those discrepancies considerably and are playing a more prominent role in Canadian economic and political affairs.

Certain patterns of prejudice and discrimination in Canada, although milder in form and substance than those expressed in the United States, are evident in past immigration policies and in the treatment of nonwhite peoples.

Canada has maintained a greater tolerance toward ethnic diversity than has the United States and can be placed among those societies we have called corporate pluralistic. Rather than a melting pot, Canada historically has advanced a mosaic ethnic ideal, according to which ethnic minorities are not expected to fully adopt the cultural ways of the dominant group. In past eras this philosophy was mostly disregarded in favor of Anglo-conformity; today, with Canada's growing ethnic diversity, the mosaic has become the society's official policy, though questions regarding its full acceptability by the Canadian public remain evident.

Suggested Readings

Bissoondath, Neil. 1994. *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*. Toronto: Penguin. The author, himself a first-generation immigrant, argues that the Canadian policy of multiculturalism is fundamentally flawed, leading only to greater societal divisiveness and the perpetuation of ethnic stereotypes.

Fleras, Augie, and Jean Leonard Elliott. 1992. *Multiculturalism in Canada: The Challenge of Diversity*. Toronto: Nelson Canada. Explains the various dimensions of multiculturalism, how it has been implemented in policy, and how Canadians have responded to it.

Fournier, Marcel, Michael Rosenberg, and Deena White (eds.). 1997. *Quebec Society: Critical Issues.* Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada. An anthology that explores various aspects of contemporary Quebec, including the issues of language and sovereignty.

Gwyn, Richard. 1995. *Nationalism without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. One of its most noted political commentators addresses Canada's ability to forge a national identity from its increasingly diverse population and its future as a multiethnic society.

Levine, Marc V. 1990. *The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. A very thorough examination of the critical role of language in sustaining Quebec nationalism and the French-English schism.

McRoberts, Kenneth. 1988. *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*, 3d ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. A comprehensive analysis of the economic and political transformation of Quebec society, addressing the overriding issue of political sovereignty.

Reitz, Jeffrey G., and Raymond Breton. 1994. *The Illusion of Difference: Realities of Ethnicity in Canada and the United States*. Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute. Based on survey data, the authors suggest that the ethnic systems of the two societies, on such issues as ethnic tolerance, acceptance of assimilation, and the economic incorporation of immigrants, are not so different as social scientists have assumed.

Resnick, Philip. 1994. *Thinking English Canada*. Toronto: Stoddart. Argues that English Canada (that is, Canada exclusive of Quebecers and Aboriginal peoples) constitutes a coherent sociological nation, the distinguishable features of which are described.

Thomas, David M. (ed.). 2000. *Canada and the United States: Differences that Count*. 2d ed. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press. A collection of essays comparing U.S. and Canadian social institutions, policies, and ideologies, including those that revolve around ethnicity and ethnic relations.

Tulchinsky, Gerald (ed.). 1994. *Immigration in Canada: Historical Perspectives*. Toronto: Copp Clark Longman. A collection of essays by historians, describing the arrival and adaptation of various groups that have contributed to the Canadian mosaic.